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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement following the denial of his motion to 
suppress, forty-five-year-old James Edwin Wolfe pleaded guilty to felony possession of 
a controlled substance.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with 
three years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Wolfe on probation for a 
period of three years.  On appeal, Mr. Wolfe asserts the district court erred when it 
denied his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 According to the district court’s findings of fact delivered at the motion to 
suppress hearing, a motorhome and PT Cruiser car pulled over on Interstate 90 after 
law enforcement used their lights to indicate the PT Cruiser should pull over.1  (See Tr., 
Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, Ls.8-10.  See generally State’s Ex. A (video recording of the traffic 
stop).)  The motorhome parked ahead of the PT Cruiser on the side of the highway.  
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, Ls.15-17.)  Kootenai County Sheriff’s Deputy Nelson 
approached the driver of the PT Cruiser, Joseph Schabow, Jr. (hereinafter, Joseph), 
and learned he was heading to North Dakota.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, Ls.17-21; 
R., p.85.)  Joseph Schabow, Sr. (hereinafter, Mr. Schabow), the driver of the 
motorhome, stepped from the motorhome as if to approach Deputy Nelson while he was 
speaking to Joseph.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, L.22 – p.11, L.1.)  Deputy Nelson 
told Mr. Schabow: “Hey man, just wait in your car for me, alright?  I appreciate it.”  (See 
                                            
1 The police pulled over the PT Cruiser for following too closely behind the motorhome.  
(See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.8-10.) 
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Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.1-4; R., pp.86-87; State’s Ex. A, 01:10 – 01:20.)  
Mr. Schabow returned to the motorhome.  (See R., p.87.) 
 Joseph indicated that Mr. Schabow was his father and they were on their way to 
North Dakota to look for jobs.  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.5-7.)  Deputy Nelson told 
Joseph he had been stopped for following the motorhome too closely, and received 
Joseph’s driver’s license, registration and proof of insurance.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, 
p.11, Ls.8-12.)  Deputy Nelson then approached the motorhome and stated he had not 
pulled over the motorhome, but Mr. Schabow told the deputy he pulled over because 
Joseph was his son.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.13-19; R., p.87.)  Upon being 
asked if he had a driver’s license, Mr. Schabow provided Deputy Nelson his driver’s 
license.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, Ls.24-25; R., p.87.)   
After other deputies arrived and Deputy Nelson returned to his patrol car, Mr. Wolfe, 
who was Joseph’s cousin and a passenger in the motorhome, stepped out of the 
motorhome and began to walk towards the deputy, who told Mr. Wolfe to wait in the 
motorhome.2  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.12, Ls.1-5, p.13, Ls.1-7; R., pp.87-88.)  Deputy 
Nelson directed Deputy Hyle to check Mr. Schabow’s information.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 
2014, p.12, Ls.6-10; R., p.88.)  While that was being done, Deputy Nelson ran his drug 
dog around the motorhome, and the drug dog alerted.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.12, 
Ls.10-12.) 
 Officers then removed Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe from the motorhome.3  (See 
R., pp.88-89.)  The officers pat searched Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe, finding nothing.  
                                            
2 The State argued Mr. Schabow exited the motorhome at this time.  (See R., p.88.) 
3 Because the district court did not make specific findings of fact on what happened 
after the drug dog alerted (see Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.10, L.3 – p.14, L.25), the facts in 
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(See R., p.89.)  Deputy Ballman told Mr. Wolfe they were about to search the 
motorhome, and Mr. Wolfe reportedly stated a small amount of marijuana and a bong 
were inside.  (See R., p.89.)  Deputies Nelson and Ballman then searched the 
motorhome, and found marijuana, methamphetamine, and several pieces of drug 
paraphernalia.  (See R., p.89.)  Mr. Wolfe was handcuffed and placed in the back of a 
patrol car.  (See R., p.89.)  After Deputy Ballman advised Mr. Wolfe of his Miranda 
rights,4 Mr. Wolfe stated he understood those rights.  (See R., p.89.)  Mr. Wolfe then 
reportedly stated the drugs and drug paraphernalia belonged to him.  (See R., p.89.) 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Wolfe had committed one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1).  
(R., pp.43-44.)  After Mr. Wolfe waived a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound him 
over to the district court.  (R., pp.51-52.)  The State then filed an Information charging 
Mr. Wolfe with one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, and one count 
of possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A.  (R., 
pp.53-54.)   
 Mr. Wolfe filed a Motion to Suppress and Notice of Hearing.  (R., pp.61-63.)  The 
grounds for the motion included “that the arrest, search and interrogation and/or the 
statements elicited from the Defendant violated the 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments of 
the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution and 
related provisions and statutes regarding search and seizure, self-incrimination and 
right to counsel,” and “that the warrantless search of the Defendant’s passenger 
                                                                                                                                  
this paragraph are taken from the State’s Amended Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Suppress.  (See R., pp.85-98.) 
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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compartment after the Defendant had been removed from the vehicle, handcuffed, and 
no longer had access the passenger compartment constituted an Unreasonable Search 
and Seizure” under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).  (R., pp.61-62.) 
 Before Mr. Wolfe filed a memorandum in support of the motion to suppress, the 
State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress.  (R., pp.64-72.)  The 
State argued Mr. Wolfe did not have standing to challenge the validity of the traffic stop, 
probable cause existed to search the motorhome after Deputy Nelson’s drug dog 
alerted to the odor of a controlled substance coming from the motor home, and 
Mr. Wolfe knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to remain silent when 
he chose to answer Deputy Ballman’s questions after being advised of his Miranda 
rights and acknowledging he understood them.  (R., pp.69-71.) 
 Mr. Wolfe subsequently filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities.  
(R., pp.75-79.)  Mr. Wolfe asserted the occupants of the motorhome were detained 
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and were not free to leave at the point 
Deputy Nelson took Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license.  (R., p.77.)  He asserted the 
detention continued with the drug dog sniff, his arrest, the search of the motorhome, 
and his custodial interrogation.  (R., p.77.)  Mr. Wolfe further asserted the probable 
cause for the search, and his statements, were obtained after an unlawful detention and 
therefore invalid as the fruit of the poisonous tree.  (R., p.78.)  He asserted his 
statements and the evidence obtained in the search of the motorhome should be 
suppressed.  (R., p.78.)  The Memorandum of Points and Authorities did not mention 
Arizona v. Gant.  (See R., pp.75-78.) 
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 The State then filed an Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Suppress.  (R., pp.85-98.)  The State conceded that any seizure of Mr. Schabow was 
also a seizure of Mr. Wolfe.  (R., pp.89-90.)  The State argued that Deputy Nelson’s 
initial contact with Mr. Schabow was voluntary.  (R., p.94.)  Assuming a seizure 
occurred when Deputy Nelson took Mr. Schabow’s license and told him to remain in the 
vehicle, the State contended the seizure was limited and reasonable.  (R., p.94.)  The 
State next argued the drug dog sniff did not extend the duration of the seizure or delay 
the driver’s license check, because Deputy Nelson directed Deputy Hyle to check the 
license while Deputy Nelson did the drug dog sniff.  (R., p.94.)   
The State further contended the warrantless search of the motorhome was based on 
probable cause, thanks to the drug dog’s alert.  (R., pp.94-96.)  The State argued the 
drug dog “is a well-trained, reliable, Idaho Certified drug detection dog.”  (R., p.88 n.7, 
p.95.)  The State also argued the custodial interrogation of Mr. Wolfe was not fruit of the 
poisonous tree, and that the search of the motorhome was not conducted incident to 
arrest, but conducted after Deputy Nelson obtained probable cause from the drug dog 
sniff.  (R., pp.96-97.)  The State requested the district court deny the motion to 
suppress.  (R., p.97.) 
At a hearing, the parties agreed, in lieu of a factual hearing, to submit a DVD of the 
video recording of the incident (State’s Exhibit A) as the factual basis for the search, 
stop, and seizure.5  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.4, L.16 – p.6, L.17; R., p.107.)  The 
parties also stipulated that Deputy Nelson did not return Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license, 
                                            
5 The State informed the district court that there was audio on the recording only 
between the first and seventh minutes into the footage.  (Tr., Oct. 2, 2014, p.5, Ls.8-12.)  
 6 
and that there was no consent to the search.6  (See R., p.107; Tr., Oct. 2, 2014, p.6, 
L.21 – p.7, L.2.) 
After reviewing the stipulated DVD, the district court held a motion to suppress hearing 
where it delivered its findings of fact.  (See R., p.110.)  During the hearing, Mr. Wolfe 
asserted a seizure occurred when Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow to wait in the 
motorhome.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.4, L.13 – p.5, L.11.)  Mr. Wolfe also asserted 
there was no evidence the drug dog was certified, but the district court declined to 
address that issue because it was “a completely new issue that would need to be raised 
by a motion and briefing and notice to the Court and notice to the other side to be ready 
for it.”  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.5, Ls.12-20, p.6, Ls.2-8.)  Additionally, Mr. Wolfe asserted 
the initial contact with the deputy was non-consensual, he was ordered to stop and 
remain without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and everything that flowed after 
that was fruit of the poisonous tree.  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.5, L.21 – p.6, L.1.)   
The State argued the initial contact was voluntary, any seizure there was limited and 
short-term, and the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was a limited seizure under 
State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992), and not against the Fourth Amendment.  (See 
Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.6, L.11 – p.8, L.8.)  The State further argued there was no 
unlawfully-extended detention, unlawful search or fruit of the poisonous tree, and that 
Arizona v. Gant did not apply because the search was before the arrest.  (Tr., Oct. 20, 
2014, p.8, L.22 – p.9, L.12.) 
                                                                                                                                  
The audio begins again about fifteen minutes into the footage, and ends around 
seventeen minutes in.  (See State’s Ex. A, 14:50 – 17:20). 
6 The district court directed the parties to submit a written stipulation of fact (Tr., Oct. 2, 
2014, p.7, Ls.3-8), but it does not appear the parties complied with that directive. 
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After delivering its findings of fact, the district court made “the conclusory finding that the 
stopping of the motorhome was voluntary by the motorhome driver.  It was, therefore, a 
consensual encounter between the occupants of the motorhome and the law 
enforcement officer.”  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.12, Ls.21-25.) 
The district court also determined Deputy Nelson’s statements to Mr. Schabow and 
Mr. Wolfe about waiting in the motorhome constituted “directions about what those 
individuals could do at that scene, but not prohibitions from those individuals driving off.”  
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.13, Ls.1-12.)  The district court likened Deputy Nelson’s 
statements to a hypothetical situation where an officer told a bystander observing an 
incident involving police interaction with other citizens to not join the conversation.  
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.13, Ls.13-20.) 
Thus, the district court found  
there was, in fact, no detention of Mr. Wolfe as the passenger in the 
motorhome until such time that, purportedly, the dog alerted on that 
motorhome, and then there became a probable cause to believe that there 
was contraband in that motorhome, and there was, therefore, reasonable 
suspicion, or even probable cause to detain those occupants further and 
to ultimately arrest them. 
 
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.2-9.)  The district court also “does not find that any 
statements made by Mr. Wolfe were the fruit of a poisonous, unlawful or unreasonable 
detention or arrest.”  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.10-14.) 
 The district court was persuaded by Godwin “that even in a consensual 
encounter, the obtaining of driver’s license, proof of insurance and registration of a 
vehicle does not shift that consensual encounter into a detention.”  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, 
p.14, Ls.15-19.)  Thus, it was “not unreasonable . . . for the law enforcement to do that.”  
 8 
(Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.19-21.)  The district court therefore denied Mr. Wolfe’s 
motion to suppress.  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.21-22; R., pp.114-15.) 
 Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Wolfe agreed to plead guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance, while preserving his right to appeal the denial of 
the motion to suppress.  (R., pp.111-12.)   The district court accepted the guilty plea.  
(R., p.111.)  The district court later imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three 
years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Wolfe on probation for a period of 
three years.  (R., pp.131-36.) 
 Mr. Wolfe filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment – 
Suspended Execution.  (R., pp.139-41.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wolfe’s motion to suppress? 
 10 
ARGUMENT 





Mr. Wolfe asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, 
because his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
was violated.  Contrary to the district court’s determination, Mr. Wolfe was seized when 
Deputy Nelson ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. 
Schabow complied with the order.  The seizure of Mr. Wolfe was illegal because it was 
not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion.  The taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s 
license was unreasonable because it came after the illegal seizure.  Even if Mr. Wolfe 
were not illegally seized, the search of the motorhome was illegal because probable 
cause for the search did not exist.  Mr. Wolfe’s incriminating statements should have 
been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.  Thus, Mr. Wolfe’s constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, and the district 
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
 
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated.  An appellate court 
defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and 
freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.  State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
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Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.  Evidence obtained in violation of these constitutional 
protections generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal 
government action.  See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518-19 (2012); State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009). 
“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable unless if 
falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.  Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 
829, 833 (2002).  “When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the 
defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement is applicable.”  Id. 
 
C. Mr. Wolfe Was Seized In The Initial Encounter With The Police, When 
Mr. Schabow Submitted To Deputy Nelson’s Show Of Authority By Waiting For 
The Deputy In The Motorhome As The Deputy Ordered 
 
 Mr. Wolfe asserts he was seized in the initial encounter with the police, contrary 
to the district court’s determination.  The district court determined that Mr. Wolfe was not 
seized until the officers detained him following the drug dog’s alert.  (See Tr., Oct. 20, 
2014, p.14, Ls.2-5.)  But Mr. Wolfe was actually seized when Deputy Nelson told 
Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied.  
 As a preliminary matter, Mr. Wolfe asserts he was seized when Deputy Nelson 
seized Mr. Schabow.  The State conceded before the district court “that any seizure of 
Mr. Schabow, Sr., as the driver of the motor home, was also a seizure of the occupants 
of the motor home (the Defendant).”  (R., pp.89-90 (citing State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 
647, 651-53 (Ct. App. 2002).)  In Gutierrez, the Idaho Court of Appeals held:  “Because 
the stop of a vehicle and detention of its driver is generally a detention of any 
passengers as well, passengers have standing to contest the reasonableness of the 
 12 
detention.”  Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650.  Based on Gutierrez and the State’s 
concession before the district court, Mr. Wolfe was seized when Deputy Nelson seized 
Mr. Schabow. 
 Here, Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe were seized when Deputy Nelson told 
Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied.  
“When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence that is alleged to have been obtained 
as a result of an illegal seizure, the defendant bears the burden of proving that a seizure 
occurred.”  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486 (2009).  A seizure occurs where an 
officer restrains the liberty of a citizen either through the officer’s “laying on of hands or 
application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately 
unsuccessful,” or the citizen’s submission to the officer’s “show of authority.”  California 
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007).  
“The test for deciding whether someone has been seized by a show of authority is an 
objective one.”  State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 165 (2004) (citing United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980)).  A seizure by a show of authority occurs 
“only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
 A seizure occurs by submission to a show of authority where an officer orders a 
citizen to wait for the officer at a particular place, and the citizen complies with the order. 
See, e.g., United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding a seizure 
occurred when the defendant asked to leave while under questioning by an officer, the 
officer ordered the defendant to stay, and the defendant complied by sitting back down); 
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Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 223 (Wyo. 1994) (holding a seizure occurred when the 
defendant complied with an officer’s order to wait at a specific street corner in view of 
the officer); State v. Barnes, 978 P.2d 1131, 1133, 1135-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding a seizure occurred where an officer ordered the defendant to wait while the 
officer checked on whether the defendant had an outstanding warrant, the defendant 
remained at the scene, and the officer did not actually tell the defendant he was free to 
leave).  Cf. State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 591-93 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding no seizure 
occurred where the defendant did not submit to a police command to stop).  Under such 
circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe he or she was free to leave.  See 
Coggins, 986 F.2d at 654; Wilson, 874 P.2d at 223; Barnes, P.2d at 1135-36. 
 Here, at the onset of the encounter with the police,7 Deputy Nelson ordered 
Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in a particular place by giving the following order:  
“Hey man, just wait in your car for me, alright?  I appreciate it.”  (See R., pp.86-87; 
State’s Ex. A, 01:10 – 01:20.)   Thus, Deputy Nelson ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for 
the deputy in the motorhome without telling Mr. Schabow he was free to leave.  (See R., 
pp.86-87.)  Mr. Schabow complied with the order by waiting in the motorhome for 
Deputy Nelson.  (See R., p.87.)  In view of all the surrounding circumstances, a 
reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s position would have believed he was not free to 
leave.  See Coggins, 986 F.2d at 654; Wilson 874 P.2d at 223; Barnes, 978 P.2d at 
1135-36. 
                                            
7 According to the district court’s findings of fact, Deputy Nelson later told Mr. Wolfe to 
wait in the motorhome, after the deputy took Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license.  (See 
Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.5, p.13, Ls.1-7.) 
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 Thus, a seizure occurred when Mr. Schabow submitted to Deputy Nelson’s show 
of authority.  See Baker, 141 Idaho at 165.  Deputy Nelson also seized Mr. Wolfe at that 
point in the encounter with the police because Mr. Wolfe was a passenger in 
Mr. Schabow’s motorhome.  See Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650.   
While the district court compared the initial encounter here to a hypothetical situation 
involving an officer telling a bystander not to join an ongoing conversation between the 
officer and other citizens (see Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.13, L.13 – p.14, L.1), the two 
circumstances are readily distinguishable.  In the district court’s hypothetical, the 
bystander was not ordered by the officer to wait for the officer at a particular place.  
Rather, the officer simply told the onlooker, “Don’t come join this conversation, stay 
back, don’t come join us.”  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.13, Ls.19-20.)  Conversely, Deputy 
Nelson in this case ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy at a particular place, 
namely in the motorhome.  (See R., pp.86-87.)  The present case is therefore readily 
distinguishable from the district court’s hypothetical. 
In sum, Mr. Wolfe was seized when Mr. Schabow submitted to Deputy Nelson’s show of 
authority by complying with the deputy’s order to wait for the deputy in the motorhome.  
The district court’s determination on when Mr. Wolfe was seized was incorrect. 
 
D. The Seizure Of Mr. Wolfe Was Illegal Because It Was Not Justified By 
Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion 
 
 Mr. Wolfe asserts that his seizure was illegal because it was not justified by 
reasonable, articulable suspicion.  At a minimum, a seizure of any individual requires 
reasonable and articulable suspicion.  Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 490.  “Typically, 
seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable.”  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 
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811.  But under an exception to the warrant requirement, “limited investigatory 
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by an 
officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to 
commit, a crime.”  See id. (explaining the standard under the Fourth Amendment); State 
v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896-97 (1991) (articulating essentially the same standard 
under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution).  “Reasonable suspicion must be based 
on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those 
facts.”  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.  While reasonable suspicion is a less-exacting 
standard than probable cause, it still “requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  “The test for 
reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer 
at or before the time of the stop.”  Id. 
 The seizure of Mr. Wolfe was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion.  
At the time of the seizure, all Deputy Nelson knew was that the motorhome had pulled 
over after he stopped the PT Cruiser on suspicion of following too closely, and that the 
motorhome’s driver had tried to approach where the deputy had stopped the PT 
Cruiser.  (See R., pp.86-87.)  Thus, there were no specific, articulable facts, much less 
rational inferences that could be drawn from such facts, that would support reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that an occupant of the motorhome had committed, or was about 
to commit, a crime.  See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.  Based on the totality of the 
circumstances known to Deputy Nelson at or before the time of the detention, there was 
no reasonable suspicion justifying Mr. Wolfe’s seizure.  See id. 
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 Thus, the seizure of Mr. Wolfe was illegal because it was not justified by 
reasonable, articulable suspicion.  As discussed above, warrantless seizures are 
presumptively unreasonable.  See Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.  When a defendant 
challenges a warrantless seizure, “the State bears the burden to show that a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.”  Id.  Here, Mr. Wolfe was seized 
without a warrant, the warrantless seizure was not justified by reasonable, articulable 
suspicion, and no other exceptions to the warrant requirement are applicable.  The 
seizure of Mr. Wolfe was unreasonable and therefore illegal under the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
 
E. The Taking of Mr. Schabow’s Driver’s License Was Unreasonable Because It 
Came After Deputy Nelson’s Illegal Seizure 
 
 Mr. Wolfe asserts the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable 
because it came after Deputy Nelson’s illegal seizure of Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe. 
Although the district court determined, based on its reading of State v. Godwin, 121 
Idaho 491 (1992), that the taking of the driver’s license here was not a detention (see 
Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.15-19), the Godwin Court actually held the taking of a 
driver’s license is a limited seizure.  Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493.  Further, Godwin only 
provides the taking of a driver’s license is reasonable if the taking comes after a valid, 
lawful contact with the driver.  Here, the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license came 
after Deputy Nelson’s illegal seizure of Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe.  Thus, Godwin 
does not establish the taking here was reasonable.  Without support from Godwin or 
any other justification, the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable. 
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 The Idaho Supreme Court held in Godwin that a limited seizure occurs when an 
officer takes a citizen’s driver’s license and tells the citizen to wait in his car.  Godwin, 
121 Idaho at 493.  In Godwin, the defendant pulled over his car ahead of another 
vehicle some time after officers stopped that vehicle for an equipment violation.  Id. at 
491-92.  The driver of the stopped vehicle told the officers she believed her driver’s 
license was in the defendant’s car.  Id. at 492.  An officer approached the defendant’s 
car, and after the officer and defendant were unable to find the other driver’s license, 
the officer took the defendant’s driver’s license for a status check.  Id.  The Court 
concluded “a limited seizure occurred when [the officer] took [the defendant’s] license 
and told him to remain in his car.  At this point, [the defendant] was arguably not free to 
leave.”  Id. at 493. 
The Godwin Court then concluded that limited seizure was reasonable.  Id. at 493, 495.  
After balancing the public interests at stake against the defendant’s right to personal 
security from arbitrary interference by officers, the Court held “that a police officer’s brief 
detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, 
lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.”  Id. 
at 495.  The Court observed its view was “consistent with a uniform body of court 
decisions in other states that a police officer who has made an otherwise appropriate 
contact with a motorist, may request the motorist’s license and run a check on that 
license without violating the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights.”  Id.  The Godwin Court 
also held that the officers did not stop the defendant, but the defendant voluntarily 
pulled over to wait for the other driver.  Id. at 496. 
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Despite the superficial similarities between the facts in Godwin and in this case, Godwin 
does not establish the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was reasonable, 
because the taking here did not come after a valid, lawful contact with the police.  To 
the extent it was even permissible, any taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was a 
seizure.  See Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493.  However, unlike the defendant in Godwin, 
Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe were already seized before Deputy Nelson took 
Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license.  Cf. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 491-92, 496.  As explained 
above, that seizure was an illegal seizure unjustified by reasonable suspicion.  Thus, 
Godwin does not establish the taking here was reasonable.  But see Godwin, 121 Idaho 
at 495-96 (discussing I.C. § 49-316, which requires drivers to surrender driver’s licenses 
to police officers upon demand, as implicitly recognizing the public interest in allowing 
officers to ask for and check driver’s licenses).  Without support from Godwin or any 
other justification, the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable. 
 
F. The Search Of The Motorhome Was Illegal Because Probable Cause To Search 
The Motorhome Did Not Exist  
 
 Even if Mr. Wolfe were not illegally seized, he asserts the search of the 
motorhome was illegal because probable cause to search the motorhome did not exist. 
The district court’s decision not to address the issue of the drug dog’s certification was 
incorrect, because the State had the burden of showing an exception to the warrant 
requirement applied.  To meet that burden, the State argued probable cause justified 
the search, the drug dog was reliable and certified, and the drug dog’s alert was the 
source of probable cause for the search.  However, the State offered no evidence that 
the drug dog was certified or otherwise reliable, meaning the drug dog’s alert did not, in 
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and of itself, provide probable cause.  The totality of the circumstances also did not 
provide probable cause for the search.  Because probable cause did not exist for the 
search, the warrantless search of the motorhome was illegal. 
 As explored above, “[w]arrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable 
unless they fall within one of several narrowly drawn exceptions.”  State v. Anderson, 
154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012).  “One of these exceptions, the ‘automobile exception,’ 
allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to 
believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.”  Id.  “Probable cause is 
established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the 
search would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable person—to a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  Id.  The probable 
cause standard “is a flexible, common-sense standard” that only requires “a practical, 
nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present.”  Id. 
 
1. The District Court Should Have Addressed The Issue Of The Drug Dog’s 
Certification 
 
Mr. Wolfe asserts the district court should have addressed the issue of the drug 
dog’s certification.  The district court incorrectly determined that it would not address the 
issue of the drug dog’s certification because it was “a completely new issue” not raised 
with a motion and briefing and notice to the district court or notice to the State.  (See 
Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.6, Ls.2-8.)  The district court also stated:  “But that’s not the issue 
that’s been raised before the Court, as to whether the dog is certified in the discipline for 
which it’s used.”  (Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.12, Ls.12-14.)  Contrary to the district court’s 
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determination, the issue was not a new issue because the State had argued the drug 
dog’s alert provided probable cause for the search of the motorhome.   
“When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears 
the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is 
applicable.”  Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.  The State, in opposition to the motion to 
suppress, argued the warrantless search of the motorhome was based on probable 
cause.  (R., pp.94-96.)  Thus, the State had the burden of showing probable cause 
existed for the search. 
In its attempt to meet that burden, the State contended the drug dog’s alert, in and of 
itself, provided probable cause for the search.  The State argued the drug dog “is a well-
trained, reliable, Idaho Certified drug detection dog.”  (R., p.88 n.7, p.95.)  The State 
then specifically contended the source of probable cause for the search was the drug 
dog’s alert: “Only after Deputy Nelson had probable cause, after the K9 positively 
indicated to the odor of a controlled substance emitting from the motor home, was the 
motor home searched.”   (R., pp.95-96.)   Further, the district court accepted the State’s 
argument, having found probable cause for the search based on the drug dog’s alert.  
(See Tr., Oct. 20, 2014, p.14, Ls.4-9.)  Thus, the issue of the drug dog’s certification 
was not a new issue, and the district court should have addressed it. 
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2. Probable Cause Did Not Exist For The Search Of The Motorhome 
Mr. Wolfe asserts probable cause did not exist for the search of the motorhome.  
The State offered no evidence that the drug dog was certified or otherwise reliable, 
meaning the drug dog’s alert did not, in and of itself, provide probable cause.  The 
totality of the circumstances also did not provide probable cause for the search.   
Under the automobile exception, “[a] reliable drug dog’s alert on the exterior of a vehicle 
is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of the 
interior.”  Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706; see State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873 
(Ct. App. 2007).  The United States Supreme Court has clarified the standards for 
assessing a drug dog’s reliability, holding “evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance 
in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.”  
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013).  The Harris Court continued: “If a bona 
fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a 
court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog’s alert 
provides probable cause to search.”  Id.  Further, a drug dog is presumed reliable “even 
if the absence of formal certification, if the dog has recently and successfully completed 
a training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.”  Id.   
 However, the Harris Court also emphasized that defendants “must have an 
opportunity to challenge such evidence of a dog’s reliability, whether by cross-
examining the testifying officer or by introducing his own fact or expert witnesses.”  Id.  
Defendants could challenge the adequacy of a certification or training program, examine 
how drug dogs or their handlers performed in their assessments made in those settings, 
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or assert the circumstances surrounding a particular alert undermined the case for 
probable cause.  See id.   
In sum, the Harris Court held that “[i]f the State has produced proof from controlled 
settings that a dog performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not 
contested that showing, then the court should find probable cause.”  Id.  “If, in contrast, 
the defendant has challenged the State’s case (by disputing the reliability of the dog 
overall or of a particular alert), then the court should weigh the competing evidence.”  Id.  
The question in this probable cause inquiry, the Court explained, “is whether all the 
facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sentence, would 
make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or 
evidence of a crime.  A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.”  Id. 
Here, the drug dog’s sniff was not up to snuff.  Under Harris, Mr. Wolfe could challenge 
the reliability of the drug dog by pointing to the lack of evidence that the drug dog was 
certified.  See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058.  The Harris Court highlighted how “evidence of 
a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide 
sufficient reason to trust his alert.”  Id.   
The Harris Court held the record in that case supported the trial court’s determination 
that the drug dog’s alert gave probable cause for an officer to search the defendant’s 
truck, because the State “introduced substantial evidence of [the drug dog’s] training 
and his proficiency in finding drugs.”  Id.  The State in Harris showed the drug dog 
successfully completed a 120-hour program in narcotic detection, separately obtained a 
certification from an independent company, and engaged in continuing training after the 
expiration of the certification.  Id.  The handling officer’s testimony and written records 
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showed the drug dog always performed at the highest level in its continuing training.  Id.  
Additionally, the defendant in Harris did not challenge in the trial court any aspect of the 
drug dog’s training, and the defendant’s cross-examination of the officer did not rebut 
the State’s case.  Id. 
Similarly, in State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held “[t]he reaction of the drug detection dog provided the probable cause to 
justify the search” of the defendant’s truck, which revealed marijuana and paraphernalia 
inside.  Braendle, 134 Idaho at 174, 176.  The Braendle Court held that, “although there 
was conflicting evidence, in light of the testimony given by the detective [who conducted 
the search with the dog], the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
a sufficient foundation had been established” for admitting evidence of the drug dog 
alerting on the defendant’s truck.  Id. at 176.  The State had presented the detective’s 
testimony on how the drug dog had been professionally trained and used as a narcotics 
dog for three or four years before the detective started working with it, and the detective 
and dog had an additional 180 hours of training together.  Id. at 175.  The detective also 
testified that in previous controlled testing and training, the drug dog alerted only on 
containers that held illegal drugs.  Id.  The defendant in Braendle challenged the drug 
dog reliability’s with testimony that the dog once alerted on school lockers where no 
drugs were found.  Id. at 175-76.  The detective in rebuttal testified that the drug dog 
might have alerted on a lingering odor of drugs in the lockers, based on the fact that the 
dog did not give false positive responses in controlled settings.  Id. at 176. 
The State in this case, rather than offer the drug dog’s certification, testimony from the 
dog’s handler, or other evidence of the dog’s reliability, only furnished conclusory 
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statements that the drug dog “is a well-trained, reliable, Idaho Certified drug detection 
dog.”  (See R., p.88 n.7, p.95.)  Those conclusory statements were insufficient to show 
the drug dog was certified or otherwise reliable.8  Cf. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058; 
Braendle, 134 Idaho at 175-76.  Because the State did not provide sufficient evidence of 
the drug dog’s certification or reliability, the State could not rely on the drug dog’s alert, 
in and of itself, to provide probable cause for the search of the motorhome.  See Harris, 
133 S. Ct. at 1058.  The sniff was not up to snuff. 
The totality of the circumstances here also did not provide probable cause for the 
search.   Apart from the drug dog’s alert, the district court did not find other facts that 
would cause a reasonably prudent person to think a search would reveal contraband or 
evidence of a crime in the motorhome.  See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058; Anderson, 154 
Idaho at 706.   
Because probable cause did not exist to justify the search of the motorhome under the 
automobile exception, and another exception to the warrant requirement was not 
applicable, the warrantless search of the motorhome was illegal.9  See Anderson, 154 
Idaho at 706. 
The search of the motorhome was illegal because probable cause did not exist.  The 
district court incorrectly decided not to address the issue of the drug dog’s certification, 
because the State attempted to meet its burden of justifying the warrantless search by 
                                            
8 The parties stipulated to submit the video recording of the stop as the factual basis 
for the search, stop, and seizure, and no testimony from the drug dog’s handling 
officer or other evidence on the drug dog’s reliability was provided to the district court.  
(See, e.g., R., p.107; Tr., Oct. 2, 2014, p.5, Ls.13-14.) 
9 The State conceded the motorhome was not searched incident to arrest under 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332.  (See R. p.96.) 
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arguing the drug dog’s alert provided probable cause and therefore placed the dog’s 
reliability at issue.  Because the State did not show the drug dog was certified or 
otherwise reliable, the drug dog’s alert did not, in and of itself, provide probable cause 
for the search. The totality of the circumstances also did not provide probable cause.  
Thus, the search of the motorhome was illegal. 
 
G. Mr. Wolfe’s Incriminating Statements Should Have Been Suppressed As The 
Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree 
 
Mr. Wolfe asserts his incriminating statements should have been suppressed as the fruit 
of the poisonous tree.  Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of the 
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures generally may 
not be used against victims of the illegal government action.  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-
11.  The exclusionary rule “applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal 
government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original 
illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree.”  Id. at 811.  “The test is whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 
has been come at by exploitation of the original illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted). 
 Here, Mr. Wolfe made the incriminating statements about his drug use and 
ownership of the drugs and paraphernalia found in the motorhome only after the officers 
committed an illegal search and/or seizure.  Specifically, all of Mr. Wolfe’s incriminating 
statements came after his illegal seizure by Deputy Nelson.  (See R., p.89.)  Further, 
Mr. Wolfe’s incriminating statements on ownership of the drugs and paraphernalia 
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followed the end of the officers’ illegal search of the motorhome.  (See R., p.89.)  Thus, 
the incriminating statements came from exploitation of the original illegality, and should 
be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.  See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. 
 In sum, Mr. Wolfe was seized when Mr. Schabow submitted to Deputy Nelson’s 
show of authority.  That seizure was illegal because it was not justified by reasonable, 
articulable suspicion.  Deputy Nelson’s taking of Mr. Schabow’s license was 
unreasonable because it came after the illegal seizure.  The search of the motorhome 
was illegal because probable cause for the search did not exist.  Mr. Wolfe’s 
incriminating statements came from exploitation of the illegal search and/or seizure, and 
should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.  Thus, Mr. Wolfe’s 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, 
and the district court erred when it denied the motion to suppress.  The district court’s 
order denying Mr. Wolfe’s motion to suppress should therefore be reversed.  See 




For the above reasons, Mr. Wolfe respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order 
which denied his motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction, 
and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 11th day of January, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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